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Igor Khrestin 
Constructing a Common Ukrainian Identity: An Empirical Study 
Introduction 
In National Identity, a seminal study concerning nations and national identity, 
Anthony Smith defines national identity as "a named human population sharing common 
myths and symbols, historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and 
common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith 1991, p.14)." According to 
Smith, these components are absolutely necessary for a nation to function. However, 
does this definition apply to the experience of all nations? Are there particular historical, 
geopolitical, or social factors that have shaped the development of a common national 
identity? 
This study will examine the factors influencing the construction of a common 
national identity in Ukraine. The uniqueness of the Ukrainian case stems from its 
oppressive Russian-dominated past, its communist experience, and a weak role of 
nationalism prior to independence. Until 1991, Ukraine lacked the necessary components 
to be considered a successful nation-state. Literally translated as "borderland," Ukraine 
has never had a readily-identifiable common territory or a common people. Harsh 
assimilatory policies of its rulers have left a sharply divided society, with differing 
languages, customs, and conflicting identities. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the 
state of Ukraine proclaimed its independence and set upon a course to build a modern 
nation - ex postfacto - by strengthening the national identity of the Ukrainian people. 
The first part of this study will examine the theoretical foundations of nations and 
nationalism as well as outline the general variables that shape collective national identity, 
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such as language, perpetuated by mass education, and urbanization. In the second part, I 
will examine these variables in the historical context of Ukraine and the various efforts to 
bolster national identity in the post-independence period. Regional cleavages and age 
will also emerge as powerful explanatory factors in the Ukrainian case. The third part 
will present the expected relationships as well as the operationalization of all variables 
for the purpose of a regression model. The findings will indicate the importance of 
language, size of locality, age, and regional variables as the primary factors shaping a 
common Ukrainian identity. The fourth part will analyze the results, point out any 
absences of relevant data and suggest necessary improvements for further analysis. 
I. National Identity and Nation-Building - A Theoretical Perspective 
What is a nation? 
Max Weber argued that it is ethnic ties, unified by a myth of common descent and 
attached to a political project, that bind an ethnic group into a nation. Thus, the nation is 
a "prestige community", endowed with a sense of cultural mission. More recent 
theorists, such as Anthony Smith and Walker Connor, support Weber's view that a nation 
stems from a "self-aware ethnic group (Gerth 1948, p.179)." According to their 
hypothesis, "potential nations" in the form of distinct ethnies have always existed, but 
have only recently matured into viable nation-states. 
Origins ofnationalism 
Most historians contend that nationalism, an ideological movement seeking to 
secure autonomy, unity, and identity for a defined group of people, is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. The liberation movements in North America and Western Europe at the 
2
 
•
 
end of the 18th century are generally cited as the causes for the dramatic shift from 
absolutism to mass national states (Hutchison 1994, p.5). Essentially, nationalism started 
a doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty, permeated by neo-classical ideals of 
patriotism and solidarity. Ernest Renan in his famous 1802 address Que 'est-ce qu 'une 
nation defined the nation as " a soul, a spiritual principle, ... a daily plebiscite (Renan in 
Hutchison 1994, p.18)." Thus, the nation exists as a common moral imperative. It is a 
solidarity sustained by a distinct historical consciousness. 
Theories ofnationalism 
The formation of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is usually 
attributed to several factors associated with the rise of the industrialized society, namely 
urbanization and the introduction of the state-sponsored mass education system. 
Benedict Anderson asserts that "the convergence of capitalism and print-technology on 
the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined 
community, which set the stage for the modem nation (Anderson 1991, p. 39)." When 
languages were formalized from rural vernaculars into print languages, only then could 
the national idea be effectively communicated to form common identities. 
Karl Deutsch's theory of social communication supports Anderson's view. Since 
people are linked by complimentary habits and facilities of communication (such as 
common language or common myths and memories), Deutsch contends, a nation will 
emerge when their communicative efficiency is strengthened. Only then, when a 
measure of effective control over the behavior of its members is established, is a 
nationality formed (Deutsch 1966, p.1 01, 104-105). 
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Literacy, then, became the only form for effective moral membership of a modem 
community in nineteenth-century Western Europe and the minimal requirement for its 
citizenship (Gellner 1964, p.158). The establishment of a state-run mass-education 
system served to ensure cultural homogeneity by inculcating patriotic values into its 
citizenry. According to Ernest Gellner, since the educational machinery must operate in 
a common medium, a dominant language was chosen to "stamp its products". Familiar 
folk symbols as well as common myths and memories were taught to forge common 
identities. Thus, the new nations were formed "from below", when the effects of 
modernization created a popular consensus of the need of common culture to integrate 
the various elements of the population into a united whole. 
The "instrumentalist" approach, particularly advanced by the Marxists, also 
asserted the vital role ofmass-education and urbanization in shaping a common national 
identity, but interpreted the modernization forces that created nations somewhat 
differently than the ethnic and cultural theorists. Historian Eric Hobsbawm, in particular, 
argues that a nation was one ofmany "invented" traditions by political elites to legitimize 
power and increase social control over the masses (Hutchison 1994, p. 48). Urbanization 
provided the perfect breeding ground for national movements in the 19th century Europe. 
The transition from a rural society - tightly regulated by feudal attachments, stable family 
structure, and the church - to overflowing urban centers bred widespread discontent 
among the lower classes. The inculcation ofpatriotic values and "invented traditions", 
formed from a patchwork of residual folk cultures, through a mass-education system 
became the way to fill the identity gap and quell discontent. With the imposition of 
universal citizenship, the worker could now feel an effective part ofthe greater collective, 
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unlike the insignificant role of the peasant during feudalism and monarchy. In reality, the 
worker remained as economically depressed as the peasant was, while the middle-class 
intelligentsia (bourgeoisie) benefited from the new economic opportunities provided by 
the nation-state and the blossoming bureaucracy. Thus, nations were created "from 
above" by bourgeoisie elements seeking control over the working class (Hobsbawm 
1990, p.1 01-111). Due to the communist experience of the 20th century Ukraine, the 
instrumentalist approach is particularly vital in examining the nation-building process in 
Ukraine. 
Impact ofInherited Cultural Values in Building National Identity 
Change of value systems imposed by mass-education does not produce uniform 
results in all societies. Cultural theorist Ronald Inglehart defines culture as "a system of 
attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted 
from generation to generation (Inglehart 1990, p. 18)." Many societies will react more 
slowly and with varying effects to broad-sweeping social changes, such as construction 
of national identities. Despite the best efforts to include varying cultural notions into a 
coherent national whole, nationalization can often be perceived as a destructive force, 
alienating one from important inherited values. For example, the Basques will generally 
be reluctant to call themselves Spanish, while Muslims in Saudi Arabia or Sudan would 
much rather identify with an overarching notion of Ummah Islam rather than with 
common identities oftheir respective nation-states. 
Impact ofMaterial Values on Identity 
Inglehart also states that individual's priorities reflect the socio-economic 
environment: the greatest subjective value is placed on those things that are in relatively 
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short supply (Inglehart 1990, p.68). Thus, nations with high prosperity levels are likely 
to be more concerned with values transcending the immediate economic welfare (Post-
Materialism), such as identity. According to most national theorists, favorable economic 
conditions will generally correspond to higher levels of identification with the nation and 
the national idea. Harry Johnson argues that nationalist economic policies, designed to 
increase the economic well-being of its members, tend to foster development of a strong 
national identity (Johnson 1965, p.182). This theory accords broadly with historical 
experience of the nation-state. 
Cultural Inferiority 
Social psychologist Carl Jung also noted that in the case of less-developed 
colonial states, people often tended to experience an inherited cultural inferiority complex 
when a "collective shadow" lead to a perception that the metropolitan power was superior 
in language, culture, achievements, and other areas. Then, a nation's own negative 
qualities could not be turned against the oppressor, so instead they were turned against 
the nation itself, resulting in further doubting and eventual acceptance of the oppressor's 
point of view (Jung in Kuzio 1998, p151). Thus, the colonial dependency would begin to 
despise its own language and culture. In the case of Ukraine, inherited imperial-Tsarist 
and communist values served as substantial impediments to instilling a notion of a 
common Ukrainian identity. 
Intergenerational conflict 
Due to difficulty of accepting cultural change, Ronald Inglehart argues that the 
older generation will be particularly resistant to major and enduring shifts in society: 
"The more central and early-learned aspects of culture are resistant to change, 
both because it requires a massive effort to change the central elements of an 
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adult's cognitive organization, and because one's most central values become 
ends in themselves, the abandonment of which would produce deep anxiety and 
uncertainty. (Inglehart 1990, p.19)" 
Thus, age can also serve as a basis of subcultural differentiation. The younger groups, for 
whom it is much easier to overcome inconsistent early learning, will tend to embrace new 
values with relative rapidity. As a result of the generational rift, Harry Eckstein asserts 
that conflicting cultural identification patterns may occur within the age spectrum 
(Eckstein 1988, p. 798). While empirical confirmations of this theory are relatively 
scant, many cultural theorists contend that age is an important variable for analysis in the 
construction of common national identities. 
Gender roles 
Tamara Mayer argues that "despite its rhetoric of equality for all who partake in 
the "national project", nation remains, like other feminized entities - emphatically, 
historically and globally - the property of men (Mayer 2000, pA)." The nation has 
largely been constructed as a "hetero-male project" and imagined as a "brotherhood" 
(Benedict Anderson). Mayer asserts that the male-dominated nation, which already 
controls women's sexuality and reproduction, also maps out the contours of their national 
identity. 
But despite women's exclusion from significant power roles in national formation 
and its political process, women are not excluded from the "national project". In what 
Mayer terms as the "gender irony", nationalist ideology often defines the nation in the 
pure, natural, and mother-like female form. The notion of the Motherland is inherent to 
many nations across the world. As asserted by Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, 
women are ideological reproducers of the nation in both the physical sense, by giving 
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birth to the members of the nation, and in the cultural sense as main socializers of 
children to national values and beliefs (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, p.6-ll). Thus, 
the nation-state will inculcate national values in women through mass-education (in the 
developed world) and as a traditional obligation (in less developed societies where formal 
education of women is generally low) because it is a crucial element ofthat nation's 
survival. 
II. Nation-Building in Ukraine: A Historical Analysis 
It is difficult to place Ukrainian nationalism into one particular theory of national 
development. The concept of a Ukrainian nation was undoubtedly imposed "from 
above" by a variety of members of the intelligentsia (following Hobsbawm's argument), 
but would never succeed without the background of modem society (Gellner) and 
improvement in social communication (Deutsch). Nineteenth century writers such as 
Taras Shevchenko and Mykola Kostomarov produced works in Ukrainian and formed 
underground societies to disseminate national thought. Historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky 
wrote a definitive History ofUkraine, asserting a distinct identity rooted in the Kievan 
Rus, a medieval East Slavic kingdom, and the Cossack glory. But it is the urbanization 
and mass literacy of the 20th century that played the most prominent role in shaping a 
common Ukrainian identity. 
Ukrainian nationalism and cultural impediments 
Ukraine declared its independence on 24 August 1991, a proclamation endorsed 
by a national referendum on 1 December 1991. When over 90% of citizens expressed the 
desire to remain independent, the country seemed surprisingly united in its national 
cause. Unfortunately, as Ukrainian scholar Victor Stepanenko concluded in his study, the 
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historic decision was largely of a socio-economic nature, and that the "national" idea was 
not the principle motive for the creation of a Ukrainian state (Stepanenko 1993, p.33). 
Supportive ofInglehart's theories concerning the difficulty of overcoming established 
notions, the inherited regional, historical, ethnic, linguistic and religious differences 
severely limited the potential appeal ofmodem Ukrainian ethno-nationalism and created 
the preconditions for a sharp polarization in Ukrainian society. 
In his seminal article "The Role ofUkraine in Modem History", Ivan Rudnytsky 
declares that Ukraine is a "non-historical" nation because the eclipse ofthe Ukrainian 
state by the Mongol conquest of the 13th century, and later, by Polish and Russian 
domination, prevented Ukrainians from developing a continuous elite and, therefore, a 
continuous notion of statehood" (Rudnytsky 1963). Because independent statehood 
seemed a remote, unattainable possibility for most of the country's history, Ukrainian 
nationalism consisted of intellectuals pursuing a "restorative agenda" of cultural revival 
and social justice (Prizel1998, p. 301). 
But perhaps the most difficult obstacle in establishing a separate identity in 
Ukraine has been the historical, cultural, and religious closeness to Russia. Russian 
people have always treated Ukrainians as "younger brothers" or "country cousins" that, 
as historian Roman Szporluk famously joked, "you may employ in the family business to 
perhaps run a branch office somewhere in the country" (Szporluk 2000, p. xxviii). 
Following lung's theory of accepted cultural inferiority, Taras Kuzio also asserted that: 
"Colonial rule usually brings with it negative self-images which developed and 
were internalized over time... This, in Ukraine's case, led to a significant portion 
of the population rejecting its own traditions while adopting the beliefs, attitudes 
and values of the oppressor. Ukrainians became instrumental in the destruction of 
their own culture and language which led to passivity and a dependency syndrome 
(Kuzio 1998, p. 152)." 
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-Most often, Ukrainians tacitly accepted the notion of "Slavic brotherhood" without 
question. In this paternalist environment, most Ukrainian nationalist claims were often 
ridiculed, both by their own population as well as the Russian authorities, and then 
harshly persecuted. For a long time, Russia could not envisage itself without the 
Ukraine, whom it considered an integral part of its own historic territory. 
The development of the common Ukrainian consciousness did not take place 
until Russia began changing the imperial model of citizenship in the mid-nineteenth 
century to the national model. This model officially denied any separate identities for 
Ukrainians and Belarussians and regarded any nascent nationalism as sheer absurdity that 
threatened the integrity of the empire (Takach 1996, p. 643). As a result, the educational 
reforms of the nineteenth century banned the use of Ukrainian language in schools, mass 
media and literary publications. Assimilation provided Ukrainians with the only way to 
avoid discriminatory policies and to achieve upward mobility. 
Unfortunately, the movement for a long time was limited to a small group of 
intellectuals. In the nineteenth century, Ukraine was an overwhelmingly rural society. 
According to an 1897 census, only 13.2% of Ukraine was urban at the time and 
Ukrainians were a decided minority in that environment: while 72.6% of people in 
Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians, the urban population constituted a mere 17%. Thus, 
ethnic Ukrainians were mostly to be found lower down the social ladder. The vast 
majority were peasants (93 %) with extremely low literacy levels (13% overall and only 
4% to 9 % in the countryside) and high poverty rates (Krawchenko 1985 p. 11). As a 
result, the leaders of the movement simply could not mobilize support among peasants 
who showed little enthusiasm for national ideals and adhered to parochial religious and 
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local identities (Takach 1996 p. 652). While a significant cultural revival had taken 
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place, very few Ukrainians had still conceived of a common national identity. 
Mass-Education and Language 
Following the theories of Deutsch, Anderson, and Gellner, nations can only be 
fonned when establishment of mass-education system, which serves to transmit national 
values in a common linguistic medium, strengthens communication among the nation's 
residents. In the Ukrainian case, literacy campaigns became such a vehicle for 
disseminating national values. 
The movement for literacy gained momentum in early twentieth century, when 
anti-Ukrainian policies were somewhat relaxed by the tsarist and then the Soviet 
governments. Ukrainian intellectuals now received pennission to teach in Ukrainian 
language, which was a highly effective tool in propagating Ukrainian national identity. 
Educational societies such as Prosvita (Enlightment), whose membership had grown to a 
considerable 197,000 by 1914, established schools and reading clubs throughout rural 
areas of Ukraine and worked to mobilize peasant support for political action (Takach 
1996, p.653 - 654). 
While the Bolsheviks despised the promotion of any Ukrainian separatist 
tendencies, the education of the peasant class (regardless ofthe linguistic medium) was 
imperative to survival of the Soviet state. Since the Soviet regime inherited an 
unenviable legacy of cultural backwardness, the first step in promoting communist ideal~ 
was to educate Ukrainian peasants. In the period of 1923-1939, "forced Ukrainisation" 
was instituted throughout the country. By 1939, 85% of Ukraine's population was 
literate. In comparison to 13% in 1897 and 24% in 1920, the change had been nothing 
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short ofmiraculous. The Ukrainian-language school system had now broken out of its 
narrow confines to become not merely an institution for Ukrainians, but for an entire 
population of Ukraine. By 1932, 87% of general education schools instituted Ukrainian 
as their language of instruction. As a result, 88% Ukraine's pupils were educated in 
Ukrainian. Ukrainian-language books, virtually non-existent in 1897, rose to 79% by 
1930 (Krawchenko 1985 p. 86-135). 
The cultural revival did not last for long, though. The Soviet government, having 
witnessed the dangers ofUkrainian national dissent during World War II and the 1950's, 
instituted Russification and Sovietization campaigns, and assured that Russian schools 
offered superior education via better funding, equipment, and teachers. By 1974, the 
number of pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools in Ukraine declined from 81 % 
in 1950 to 60%. In Kyiv, the capital ofUkraine, the number ofUkrainian-language 
schools had declined to 23% ofthe total (Krawchenko 1985 p. 176, 230). The schools in 
eastern urban centers were now completely Russified. Russian language was now taught 
in every school, while Ukrainian language was no longer compulsory. The higher 
education was fully Russified as well, with only about a third of Ukrainian-language 
higher education institutions. As a result, only 17% of post-secondary level textbooks in 
1968 were printed in the Ukrainian language. The Soviet system offered free choice for a 
parent to choose the school for their children, but the incentive of a Russian-language 
education greatly outweighed the Ukrainian-language alternative. 
Although still ethnically predominant, Ukrainians constituted a linguistic minority 
in 1989 because only 43% of the population considered Ukrainian their native language. 
Over a third ofnative Ukrainians in 1989 preferred Russian as their language of 
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convenience. While 59.3 % of Eastem Ukrainians identified themselves as ethnic 
Ukrainians, only 13% of them spoke Ukrainian. The capital Kyiv in 1989 was 79.7% 
Ukrainian, and only 45.8% spoke Ukrainian. The number of pupils in Ukrainian­
language schools had further declined to 47.5% by 1989. Other tools of cultural 
reproduction, such as Ukrainian-language mass media, also declined in their relative 
importance and regional scope (Wilson 1998, p.20-23). 
After independence in 1991, the government instituted Ukrainisation policies, 
focusing on promotion of Ukrainian language and Ukrainian-language media across the 
country to raise national consciousness. The Ukrainian Languages Law of 1989 had 
already established Ukrainian as the titular language of the state, required state 
bureaucrats to use Ukrainian within five years and envisaged a rolling program for the 
Ukrainisation ofhigher education by the end of the century (Wilson 1997 p. 156). State 
programs of 1991 and 1992 reaffirmed these goals and called for an immediate 
acceleration of the process. 
In the early 1990's, major reorganization ofthe school system took place. Every 
Ukrainian secondary school now requires instruction of Ukrainian language, whether in 
primary form (all subjects) or in secondary form (language course). According to the 
Ministry of Education decree of 1993, the instruction of Russian is no longer compulsory 
across Ukraine (ArelI995, p.606). School curriculums were now mandated to teach 
Ukrainian literature and national history in an effort to inculcate patriotic values. 
Nationalist history books, once banned, were now the textbooks of Ukrainian history, 
preaching unique Ukrainian nation and people with Kievan roots and Cossack glory. 
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Since independence, a new language policy has been in place on Ukrainian TV 
that aimed toward broadcasting exclusively in Ukrainian. In particular, all news 
programs in the country are now conducted in the Ukrainian language. The same rule 
now applies to government-owned print media (Are11995, p. 612). In reactionary areas 
of Western Ukraine, regional authorities even banned a number of Russian-language 
publications in an effort to promote Ukrainian-language media. 
Urbanization 
Rapid industrialization and urbanization swept through Ukraine in the 1930's. 
The intense tempo of the Stalinist Five-Year Plans required a large urban labor force as 
well as a number of qualified engineers and technicians. The migration to urban centers· 
radically altered the Ukrainian national composite: by 1939, ethnic Ukrainians had made 
up a majority of urban population - 58.1 %. As a result, the class structure had changed 
as well. Workers and white-collar staff were now 66.1 % and 56% Ukrainian, 
respectively (Krawchenko 1985, p.119, 133). Perpetuated by a cultural revival, a highly' 
effective system of mass education, and rapid growth of the middle class, the number of . 
Ukrainians in the cities increased rapidly. As affinned by Gellner's theory, the urban 
center now became the purveyor of common identity. Only the in western areas of 
Ukraine, which joined the Soviet Union after the Ribentropp - Molotov Pact in 1939, 
remained largely rural and isolated from rapid urban development of the east. Ukrainian 
nationalism there was still highly idealistic and was only exhibited at high-culture levels. 
Unfortunately, while the rates of urbanization and the Ukrainian middle class 
continued to grow at a steady rate into the 1970's, Ukrainian identity began to decline in 
Eastern and Central Ukraine, mostly due to assimilatory policies of the Soviet 
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government. In an effort to "dilute" the Ukrainian population, the Soviet government 
actively encouraged the migration of workers from Russia to Eastern and Southern 
Ukrainian factories. As a result, between 1959-1970, the overall growth rate of ethnic 
Ukrainians was 9.72%, while the Russian population grew by 28.71 % in the same period 
(Szporluk 2000 p. 80). By the end of the 1980's, the Russian population in Ukraine 
increased by more than 60% since the 1960's, with most settling in the industrial areas of 
the east. 
III. The Success of Nation-Building in Independent Ukraine: 
An Empirical Study 
In the statistical analysis, I will use individual-level data from the 1996 
Eurobarometer survey for Central and Eastern Europe. This year is particularly 
interesting to examine as a result of President Kuchma's famous declaration that the 
nation-building process is complete in Ukraine (Kuzio 1998, p.14). In his speech, 
Kuchma mostly considered successful political consolidation and distancing of Ukraine 
from Russia, but also hinted at successful policies of national consolidation as well. 
Hypotheses 
In Section I, Social theorists such as Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson, and Deutsch 
presented several important factors in national development, including mass-education, 
urbanization, and linguistic development. Robert Inglehart's analysis of cultural values, 
materialism, and intergenerational conflict pointed to income and age as possible 
determinants of national identity. Tamara Mayer, among others, argued that gender also 
plays an important role in national formation. In Section II, these variables were 
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presented in light of Ukrainian national development. Regional cleavages also emerged 
as a powerful explanatory factor in explaining nation-building in Ukraine. 
Drawing from the evidence presented in the literature review, I expect to support 
the following hypotheses: 
HI: Identification with Ukrainian nationality will increase with the knowledge of 
Ukrainian language. 
When combined with the mass-education system and the media, I expect Ukrainian 
language to be the most significant factor in shaping Ukrainian identity. Development of 
Ukrainian language was a primary determinant of nation-building efforts in Ukraine. 
Linguistic reform in schools and media mostly targeted a large amorphous Russophone 
population, inherited after seven decades of Soviet rule, without a conscious national 
identity (local or Soviet identities), but also hoped to "convert" those who actively 
identified with Russian nationality (Kuzio 1998, p.l 04). 
H2: Citizens residing in more urbanized settings are more likely to identify with 
Ukrainian nationality. 
As postulated by Gellner and Hobsbawm, urbanization is a historical process of 
modernization that created more effective channels of communication, such as mass­
education systems, mass-media, and cultural centers, an environment highly conducive 
for distribution of nationalist ideals (see Section I). When the urban environment is 
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employed to promote the national cause, studies have indicated an increase in common 
national identity. Statistical findings in Ukraine from the 1930's until the early 1960's, 
when urbanization was complemented by promotion of common Ukrainian identity, 
support this theory. The trend was predictably reversed in the 1970's, when cultural 
institutions in urban centers were altered to promote Russian and Soviet values, and has 
once again been reversed since independence. 
H3: The younger citizens will have stronger attachments to Ukrainian nationality 
than the older citizens will. 
According to cultural theorists Ronald Inglehart and Harry Eckstein, the older generation 
is more resistant to social change, which can create a "subcultural differentiation" 
between the age groups (see Section I). In Ukraine, this theory is particularly valuable in 
explaining the conflict between the older generation, brought up with communist values ' 
and overarching Soviet identities, and the younger generation, who are being socialized 
in the national-democratic model ofthe independent Ukraine. Taras Kuzio argues that 
the older generation will tend to cling to old Soviet and Pan-Slavic identities, often 
through affiliation with Communist or Socialist Parties of Ukraine (Kuzio 1998, p.157). 
M.N. Guboglo attributes the phenomena to "nostalgic feelings for a great power that has 
been lost" and argues that independence signaled the loss of ethnic (Pan-Slavic) as well 
as civic (Soviet) identities for those who lived most of their conscious lives as citizens of 
the Soviet Union (Guboglo 1996 p.99-100). 
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H4: Residents of Western, Central and Northern Ukraine are more likely to identify 
with Ukrainian nationality. 
Isolated from the pressures of industrialization and urbanization of the 1930's and 
having benefited from complete historical absence of Russians, Western Ukraine 
emerged as the center of Ukrainian culture and the cradle of Ukrainian nationalism. 
During the Soviet times, Western Ukraine retained its distinct Ukrainian identity in the 
midst of general decay of that identity in the east. By 1970, 95% of schools and 85% of 
the print media were operated in the Ukrainian language (Krawchenko 1985, p.230). As 
a result, the Ukrainian population increased from about two-thirds ethnic Ukrainian to 
overwhelming 93% by the time of independence. 
H5: Residents of Crimea, as well as Southern and Eastern regions, are less likely to 
identify with Ukrainian nationality. 
The Crimea also merits special consideration since it has been declared an 
autonomous republic in 1992, thus rendering itself immune to nearly all identity­
strengthening measures. It originally joined the Ukraine in 1954 under Khrushchev's 
leadership, but its people never identified with the Ukrainian nation. Only about a 
quarter of Crimean residents considered themselves Ukrainian at the time of 
independence, and the number has not changed much since. In a 1996 survey, only 27% 
indicated that Crimea should remain a part of Ukraine (Kuzio 1998, 116). 
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The Eastern and Southern regions should show negative relationships as well. 
Due to deep-rooted Russification and centuries-old Ukrainophobia, often still promoted 
by the local nomenklatura, any affirmative action in the cities of Eastern Ukraine was 
extremely suspicious and often hostile in the eyes of the predominantly Russophone 
population. 
Variable operationalization 
The following table presents all ofthe variables employed in the study, followed 
by a short justification for measurement techniques. I 
Table 1: Variables Employed 
Type and Name of Variable Measurement 
DV: National Identity (0,1): O-Ukrainian, 1- Other 
IV: Ukrainian Langua~e (Primary) (0,1): 0- Ukrainian, 1- Other 
IV: Ukrainian Language (Secondary) (0,1): 0- Ukrainian, 1- Other 
IV: Region (0,1): REGWEST, RECENTR, 
REGNORTH, REGSOUTH, REGEAST, 
REGKYIV, REGCR/ME 
IV: Type ofCommunity (1-3): 1-Big City, 2-Provincial town, 3­
Rural Area 
IV: Age (1-5): Younger to Older 
IV: Level ofEducation (1-3): Higher to Lower 
IV: Income (1-11): Hif!her to Lower 
Identity: In the survey, the question that respondents answered was "What is your nationality?" About 
36 choices ofvarious national groups were given for the respondent to choose. Since I am only interested 
in Ukrainian identity, the variable was collapsed into a dummy variable of "Ukrainian" and "other". 
Language: The survey asks the respondents two questions about language preferences, first as the 
primary language, and the second as a secondary language. Once again, an array ofchoices is given, but 
since I am only interested in "Ukrainian" and "other", both these variables were collapsed and presented 
as dummy variables in the study. 
Region: The various regions ofUkraine were also recoded as dummy variables to measure the impact of 
each specific one on Ukrainian national identity. 
IGender will not be included as one of the variables in the study. Theoretical discussions in Section I as 
well as the communist legacy of gender consideration (high levels of education and political representation) 
do not point to gender as a valid basis of identity differentiation in the case ofUkraine. 
19 
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Individual Correlations 
The following table presents the individual correlations of the independent 
variables to the dependent variable using Speannan's rho test, which is most suitable for 
examining ordinal-level data. 
Table 2: Individual Correlations 
Independent Variable Correlation 
Coefficient 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
Language (Primary) .698 .000*** 
Language (Secondary) -.427 .000*** 
Crimea Region -.238 .000*** 
Western Region .174 .000*** 
Central Region .086 .003** 
Kyiv .017 .560 
Northern Region -.002 .949 
Eastern Region .059 .042* 
Southern Region -.078 .007 
Type of Community -.256 .000 
Age -.017 .550 
Level of Education .143 .000*** 
Income .074 .010** 
Dependent variable: UkrainIan Identity
*** - statistically significant at the .00 I level 
** -statistically significant at the .01 level 
* - statistically significant at the .05 level 
Language 
As expected, the primary language variable has a high correlation levels with 
Ukrainian identity (.698 and significant at the .001 level), while the secondary language 
variable has a strong negative correlation at -.427 and is significant at the .001 level as 
well. 
Region 
As predicted, individual correlations in Western and Central region produced 
positive results, with the West significant at the .001 level and the Center at .01. The 
Crimea and Southern Ukraine displayed negative correlations: Crimea strongly negative 
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at -.238 and significant at .001 level and the South negative and significant at the .01 
level. The only surprises were the weak displays ofNorthern Ukraine and Kyiv2 (no 
significance) and the positive correlation of Eastern Ukraine (statistical significance at 
.05 level) with Ukrainian identity. 
Type ofCommunity 
Because the questionnaire orders the size from higher to lower density of 
population, the correlation in this case was negative. As predicted, it was strong (-.256) 
and statistically significant at the .001 level. 
Age, Income, and Level ofEducation 
While running correlations, there were several surprises in standard demographic 
variables as well. Contrary to my predictions, age did not prove to be statistically 
significant, while level of education was surprisingly statistically significant at the .001 
level. The income variable was not statistically significant as well. 
Logit Analysis 
Further statistical analysis is needed to gain a broader understanding of the impact 
that the various variables have on producing a common Ukrainian national identity. One 
way to achieve this is through logit analysis. Since we are estimating the likelihood of 
one factor upon a respondent's choice of nationality, this analysis is a more appropriate 
way of estimation because it employs a sigmoid instead of a linear function3. In our data, 
identity is not a continuous variable - you are either Ukrainian or not - as well, so this 
2 For the regression model, Kyiv will not be included in the estimation since one cannot put all the regions 
into the equation as dummy variables without violating the assumption that the explanatory variables are 
not exactly linearly related (Hanushek and Jackson 177, p.104). Instead, the effects of Kyiv will show up 
as part of the estimated equation's constant term 
3 While linear analysis assumes the variable to be a continuous function, logit and probit analyses assess the 
values that are concentrated around 0 and 1. 
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type of analysis would be needed to prevent "nonsense" predictions and more accurately 
estimate the impact of the independent variables. 
In logit estimation, one hypothesizes that the probability of the occurrence of the 
event is determined by the function: 
ziPi = F(Zi)=l/l+e- , 
where Z is defined as a linear combination of the explanatory variables, Xl through XI3: 
Z= constant +Beta1X1+...+Beta13X13 
(Dougherty 2001). Thus, as the Z tends to infinity, e-Ztends to 0 and p has a limiting 
upper bound of 1. When Z tends to minus infinity, e-z tends to infinity and p has a 
limiting lower bound of O. Thus, there is no possibility of the probability being greater 
than 1 or less than O. 
The usual method of calculating marginal effect is at the mean of the explanatory 
variables. Thus, 
Z= constant +BetalMl+...+Beta13M13, 
where Mi is the mean of the variable Xi. 
The marginal effect of Z on the probability, denoted feZ), is given by the 
derivative of the logit function: 
feZ) = e-z/(l+e-z)2 
The probability of the individual variables is then given by f(Z)*Betai (Dougherty 2001). 
This number will indicate the exact percentage of impact caused by the individual 
independent variables. 
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Table 4 presents the logit analysis output: 
Table 4: Logit Analysis 
Model Summary 
•
 
-2 Log Likelihood Cox & Snell R Square INegelkerke R Square I 
706.532 .413 I .612 I 
LOGITANALYSIS: Marginal 
Effects 
Variables Mean Beta Beta*mean Sig. Marginal 
Effects 
EDUCATION LEVEL 2.8683 0.1172 0.3362 0.414 0.0109 
AGE OF RESPONDENT 3.0392 0.2170 0.6595 0.009** 0.0202 
,TYPE OF COMMUNITY 2.9567 -0.3205 -0.9476 0.020* -0.0298 
INCOME 5.1683 0.0070 0.0362 0.874 0.0007 
CRIMEA REGION 0.8400 -0.5806 -0.4877 0.214 -0.0540 
WESTERN REGION 0.8575 -0.9428 -0.8085 0.123 -0.0877 
CENTRAL REGION 0.8733 -1.1344 -0.9907 0.041 * -0.1055 
NORTHERN REGION 0.8133 -0.6816 -0.5544 0.159 -0.0634 
EASTERN REGION 0.8125 -0.3509 -0.2851 0.474 -0.0326 
SOUTHERN REGION 0.8533 -0.6686 -0.5705 0.178 -0.0622 
Ukrainian language (primary) 0.3500 4.6856 1.6400 .000*** 0.4359 
Ukrainian as second language 0.7917 0.5533 0.4380 .014* 0.0515 
-1.9395 
Constant -0.2161 
Z variable feZ) 
-2.1556 0.0930 
.
 
..Dependent vanable: Ukralman Identity 
*** - statistically significant at the .001 level 
** - statistically significant at the .01 level 
* - statistically significant at the .05 level 
The beta*mean, Z variable, f(Z), and the marginal effect calculated by author. 
Logit Results 
The age, the type of community, the Central Region, and both the language variables 
are statistically significant at various levels. The level of education is no longer 
statistically significant, while the age variable now supports Inglehart's generational 
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conflict theory. The logit model was also able to reveal the exact marginal effect of each 
statistically significant variable on the dependent variable. These are the final results: 
1) A respondent is more likely to identify with Ukrainian nationality by 2.02% as 
the age variable increases by one category. 
2) The probability of a respondent identifying with Ukrainian nationality increases 
by 2.98% as the population concentration increases by one category.4 
3) Residents of Central Ukraine are 10.55% more likely to identify with Ukrainian 
nationality. 
4) A person speaking Ukrainian as a primary language is 43.59% more likely to 
identify with Ukrainian nationality. 
5) A person speaking Ukrainian as a secondary language is 5.15% more likely to 
identify with Ukrainian nationality. 
The logit model further supported our hypotheses. The analysis confirmed the 
significance oflanguage, age, type of community and the Central region variable as well 
as added a vital component of validity by estimating the marginal effect of each of the 
independent variables. 
Insignificant Variables 
Western Region 
The evidence presented in the regression is a bit puzzling. Western Ukraine has 
been the cradle ofUkrainian nationalism since the 1940's, when the highly-nationalistic 
region of Galicia joined the Soviet Union. As I described before, the region is almost 
universally Ukrainian-speaking and is home to all the right-wing nationalist parties of 
4 The survey was coded in the opposite direction: l-highest concentration, 3-lowest concentration. Thus, 
the marginal effect appears negative in Table 4.. 
24 
•
 
Ukraine. One factor responsible may be the emergence of historic minorities of Western 
Ukraine, such as the Poles, Hungarians, and Rusyns (a minority group in the Carpathian 
Mountains that identifies itself as a separate Slavic group). Generally assimilated into 
Ukrainians under "Ukrainisation" policies of the 1930's and early 1940's, these groups 
have emerged to assert their distinctive identities during the minority-favorable climate 
during the post-independence period (Kuzio 1998, p. 165). 
Level ofEducation 
The level of education variable was predictably insignificant in the study. While 
the studies of national theorists have asserted the importance of mass-education as 
vehicle to promote national values, level of education is only important at the initial 
stages of national formation, when high illiteracy levels provide the "raw" products, onto 
which mass-education imprints its values and beliefs (see Section I). They do not, 
however, stress the importance of the particular level of education as much as the content 
of such education. Gellner, Deutsch, and Hobsbawm all assert the importance of mass­
education in a common linguistic medium as a primary vehicle of building a common 
identity. Statistical data in Ukraine from the 1930's, when literacy campaigns and mass­
education in the Ukrainian language was serving to promote a separate Ukrainian 
identity, is consistent with this theory. 
After the repression of the post-war period, mass-education promoted Soviet and 
Russian values, resulting in the decline of Ukrainian identity. But because the populace 
was almost universally educated by that time, it would be ridiculous to claim that an 
increase in the level of education was responsible for producing the shift. The change in 
values was manifested in other factors, such as the ideological switch to an overarching 
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Soviet identity and, more importantly, a switch to Russian language as a means of access 
to higher-level societal benefits. After independence, the trend reversed itself once more 
toward promotion of a separate Ukrainian identity by reviving Ukrainian language in 
various spheres of education and cultivation of national values. 
Common values promoted by the post-independence reforms, mainly the increase 
iIi use of Ukrainian language as a primary means of communication, are the more 
accurate measures of the success ofmass-education in promoting a common Ukrainian 
identity. 
Income 
Social and national theories accord an important role for socio-economic 
conditions in determining identity (Section 1). In Ukraine, as Taras Kuzio argues, the 
crisis in identity is undoubtedly linked to the socio-economic crisis that arose during 
post-independence (Kuzio, 1998 p.150). The inability of the government to provide 
economic security has aided in sustaining old Soviet and regional identities. However, 
because ofhistorical regional disparities, social factors, and linguistic development, the 
individual income has not historically been one of the more determining factors in 
producing national identity in Ukraine. 
IV: Omissions, Inconsistencies, and Further Research 
Too many Ukrainians?: An important omission ofsurvey data 
The main criticism of these encouraging findings is a lack of important factors 
omitted in the survey. When the survey asked Ukrainian residents for their nationality, 
the choices were limited in the way that many citizens might have "forcibly" identified 
themselves as Ukrainians. Since the choices only included national groups, many 
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residents may not have had the opportunity to express regional, local, or Soviet identities, 
which are still widely prevalent across Ukraine, especially in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine. As Taras Kuzio states in his study, besides conscious national identities 
(Ukrainian, Russian or other minority), there are also Soviet, Little Russian and pre­
modern identities, which define themselves in terms of "otherness" (not Russian, not 
Ukrainian, but with no clear idea of what they are). In this case, a better question than 
"What is your nationality" might have been "What do you most closely identify yourself 
with" or "What is your homeland". In absence of those choices in the survey, the 
residents might have picked Ukraine simply because of residence status, not a genuine 
attachment. For example, in a 1995 New Democracies Barometer survey (Table 5) that 
asked the "most closely identify" question, Ukrainian residents chose "my country" in 
34% of the cases, while 45% chose "town or district where I live" and another 12% chose 
the non-existent Soviet Union. Unfortunately, I could not use that survey as it lacked 
other important data necessary for a regression. In a 1994 Political Portrait of Ukraine 
general survey that asked the "homeland" question, only 34% of East, South, and Crimea 
identified themselves as Ukrainians (see Table 6). Thus, an omission ofthese questions 
and options in the Eurobarometer survey might have "produced" more Ukrainians that 
exist in reality. 
The role oflanguage as an explanatory variable in shaping Ukrainian identity 
One can hardly doubt the success of linguistic integration in Ukraine, especially 
in the Central region of the country. In fact, from 1990-1995 the number of school pupils 
in Kyiv educated in the Ukrainian language grew from 31 % to 64% (Kuzio 1998, p.173). 
Unfortunately, this process was not uniformly successful in Eastern and Southern 
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regIOns. Rates in Eastern cities of Donetsk and Luhansk grew from 3% and 7% in 1990 
by a meager 2% each in 1995. Crimea remained with virtually no Ukrainian-languages 
schools whatsoever (0.1 % of the total). The Western region, already displaying 
extremely high levels in 1989, did not matter much in this process. 
As a result, this regression model somewhat overstates the role of language in 
producing a common Ukrainian identity. While the scholars of nationalism predict 
language to be a crucial factor, many scholars of Ukraine have pointed out the deep 
divisions that exist in the linguistic landscape of Ukraine. Once again, the survey data 
might have been a bit exaggerated due to the question posed to the respondents ("What 
language do you speak?" (1 and 2)). Bilingualism is almost universal in Ukraine, with 
many considering Ukrainian their first language simply because they use it in the public 
sphere, as it is required by new language laws. In 1995, 88.2% ofthe Ukrainian 
population indicated that they are able to speak, read, and write in the Ukrainian language 
(Kuzio 1998, p. 180). As Dominique Are! asserts, a language one speaks well may not 
necessarily be the language most often used in daily intercourse (Are! 1996, p. 82). A 
better question might have been "what is your language of convenience?" or even "what 
is your native language?", which also signals stronger levels of attachment. A 1996 
study asking the former revealed that only 18.5% of Easterners use Ukrainian as their 
"language of convenience" (See Table 7). When the"1994 Political Portrait ofUkraine" 
survey asked the latter alternative, only 22% of residents ofthe North East, 29% of the 
Donbas region of the East, and 15% of Crimeans indicated Ukrainian as their native 
language (Kuzio 1998, p.179). The "1995 Socio-Political Portrait of Four Ukrainian 
Cities" indicated that Donetsk (Eastern Ukraine) and Simferopol' (Crimea) residents 
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consider Ukrainian their native language only in 19.4% and 9.3% of the cases 
respectively (See Table 8). 
lVeedforfurlherana~s~ 
There are several variables missing in this survey that might play an important 
role in further analysis of Ukrainian identity. Religion is the first ofthese variables. 
While most of Ukrainian residents are Orthodox, there has been a revival ofthe Greek 
Catholicism (or Uniate Church) and Roman Catholicism in Ukraine. The former one has 
been especially active in asserting itself as the "true" religion ofthe Ukrainian nation. 
Another two variables that should be included are left-to-right self-placement and party 
affiliation. Here, one can assert that those who support leftist parties are less likely to be 
Ukrainian that those who support centrist and rightist parties. 
Conclusions 
Theorists of nationalism, such as Ernest Gellner, Karl Deutsch, Benedict 
Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm, have identified increase in mass-communication, a 
common linguistic medium, and urbanization as primary factors responsible for shaping a 
common national identity and the emergence of a stable nation-state. While asserting 
nationalism played a relative weak historical role in the case of Ukraine, these factors 
were substantially strengthened, especially in the post-independence period.since 1991. 
Other variables, such as age and region, were also predicted to have a substantial effect in 
shaping a common Ukrainian identity. 
The 1996 Eurobarometer survey is used as a basis for a linear regression model 
and logit analysis to test the statistical significance ofthese variables in shaping a 
common Ukrainian identity. As predicted, most variables proved statistically significant 
29
 
•
 
at various levels, especially the language variables. The only surprise was the 
insignificance of Westem region as an independent factor shaping Ukrainian identity. 
Due to several problems in question format and choice options, the analysis may' 
have overstated the number of "Ukrainian" respondents as well as the role of language as 
an overwhelmingly significant factor in the regression. As several other surveys suggest, 
the language situation is much more complex in Ukraine. Also, there were several 
variables missing in the survey, such as religion, party preference, and ideology, which 
might have impacted the formation of Ukrainian identity. 
30
 
•
 
Source: New Democracies Barometer Survey for 1995, www.rs2.tarki.hu/ndb 
Table 6 
What do you consider to be your homeland? (%) 
North East East South Donbas Crimea Total 
Appendix 
Table 5 
Which do you most closely identify yourself with? 
No answer 2% 
Town, district 45% 
Region 5% 
Country (Ukraine) 34% 
Europe 1% 
Soviet Union 12% 
Other 1% 
Ukraine 35% 55% 48% 23% 3% 34% 
CIS 10% 5% 5% 9% 4% 7% 
USSR 21% 17% 23% 34% 37% 27% 
Russia 2% 1% 0% 2% 14% 3% 
Region 26% 17% 16% 25% 40% 23% 
Europe 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Don't know 5% 3% 7% 6% 2% 5% 
Source: Bekeshkma, Iryna. "Stavlenma Nasellenma Skhodu 1 PlVdma do Problem 
Nezalezhnosti". Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy, no.9, 1994, p.46. 
Table 7 
What is your language of convinience? 
East 
Ukrainian 18.5%
 
Russian 81.5% 23%
 
Source: Arel, Dominique and Valeri Khmelko. "The Russian Factor and Territorial
 
Polarization in Ukraine". The Harriman Review, v. 9, no.I-2, 1996, p. 82.
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Ukrainian 75.9% 58% 19.4% 9.3% 
Russian 22.8% 41.7% 79.6% 82.2% 
Other 2.3% 0.5% 1.7% 8.5% 
Table 8
 
What is your native language (mother tongue)?
 
Lviv Kyiv Danetsk Simjeropol' 
•
 
Source: "Sotsial 'no-Politichnyi Portet Chotyriokh Mist Ukrainy". Politychnyi Portret 
Ukrainy, no.13, 1995, p.69. 
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